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HOW WELL CAN ONE GET TO KNOW 
A STRAWSONIAN PERSON?* 
I shall argue that one cannot get to know a Strawsonian person, 
to speak in a popular way. To speak more philosophically, Strawson 
has a metaphysical theory of persons which involves serious epis- 
temological difficulties. I shall begin by establishing that Strawson 
is committed to three claims: 1) the concept of a person is a priori, 
2) persons are "items" or "things" which cannot be experienced, and 
3) we apply the concept of a person to a particular Strawsonian per- 
son (subject of experiences and bodily characteristics) "via" his body. 
Then I shall argue that good reasons for this view are not provided 
and offer explanations of why Strawson does not recognize this 
difficulty. 
Strawson's denial that we experience persons emerges in his dis- 
cussion of the origin of the concept of a person. He does not explain 
at any length how he uses 'concept' and, on occasion, its equivalent 
(for him), 'idea.'" But he does present an argument when discussing 
the origin of the concept of a person which shows that he sometimes 
thinks about concepts and ideas in terms not unlike those of the 
proverbial empiricist: generally, concepts are "derived from" objects 
which we have experienced. Minimally, this implies that we would 
not have such concepts if we did not experience the appropriate, 
correlative objects. Strawson's concept of a person, since it does not 
meet this condition, is a priori. To be more cautious, this is what I 
shall mean by calling it a priori. 
*An earlier version of this paper was read at the Eastern Division meetings of the 
American Philosophical Association on December 29, 1971. David Clarke, the commen- 
tator, made helpful criticisms which led to revision. 
1 The "Persons" chapter of Strawson's Individuals (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 
1965) makes it clear that 'concept' and 'idea' may be used interchangeably. I shall talk 
mainly of concepts of persons, following Strawson's apparently preferred usage. For 
some incisive comments on this and related points, see C. W. K. Mundle's important 
book, A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), passim. 
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The argument in question is: 
. . . To have the idea of himself, must he not have the idea of the subject 'of 
the experiences, of that which has them? . . . To have the idea at all, it seems 
that it must be an idea of some particular thing of which he has experience, and 
which is set over against or contrasted with other things of which he has exper- 
ience, but which are not himself. But if it is just an item within his experience 
of which he has this idea, how can it be the idea of that which has all of his 
experiences?2 
I maintain that in this argument Strawson denies that we can and 
do experience persons. His thought seems to proceed as follows. In 
general, concepts meet the minimal condition mentioned: we do not 
have them unless we have experienced the appropriate objects. This 
leads to a kind of paradox in the case of the concept of a person, a 
subject of experiences. According to the argument, there is a single 
subject for each individual person or man, and in experiencing an 
object the subject having the experiences is not itself experienced. 
One cannot experience oneself because this would require a second 
subject. The existence of a second subject, in the case of experience 
of oneself by oneself, would contradict the assumption that a man is 
(or has) only a single subject of experiences. So we are left in the 
paradoxical position of maintaining that we have a concept which 
does not meet a minimal general condition for our having concepts 
because we cannot experience persons.3 
Strawson does not conclude either that we do not have the con- 
cept of a person, or that in some sense we must experience persons, 
e.g., other persons. Rather, he concludes that we have the concept 
and that the question of how we can have it, given that we do not 
experience persons, must be faced. I conclude that for Strawson the 
concept of a person is a priori and that persons, viewed as subjects 
of experience, are "items" or "things" (Strawson's words) which 
2 Strawson, op. cit., pp. 88-89. Strawson suggests in this context a distinction be- 
tween the concept of a person and the concept of some particular person, say oneself. 
It is the only place he suggests the distinction; elsewhere he blurs it. 
It is also worth noting these remarks on p. 88: 
. Keeping before our minds the picture of an auditory world . . . may help to give 
us a continuing sense of the strangeness of what we in fact do; and this sense of 
strangeness we want to keep alive in order to see that we really meet it and remove it, 
and do not just lose or smother it." The strangeness, it becomes clear, is in our dis- 
tinguishing a subject from all that we experience and yet ascribing experiences to this 
unexperienced subject. Thus he sees confronting and eliminating the strangeness of 
the relevant distinctions and ascriptions, not the distinctions and ascriptions them- 
selves, as an important task. 
3 It is, of course, pertinent that Strawson at no point asserts or implies that we 
experience other subjects either. Thus he does not avail himself of the possibility that 
we have the concept of a person as a result of experience of other persons. 
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cannot be experienced. (One could also say that the concept of a 
person which we have, on this view, is a priori because persons can- 
not be experienced.) These are two of the three claims I attribute to 
Strawson. 
The question at the end of the passage is: how can the concept 
of a person be a concept of an unexperienced subject? The question 
is not a very clear one. But I think it is fair to say, on the basis of 
the "Persons" chapter as a whole, that Strawson is asking two ques- 
tions: what is the origin of the concept and how do we apply it to 
subjects of experience? 
With respect to the question of the origin of the concept of a 
person, Strawson is inclined to say two kinds of things. On the one 
hand, he repeatedly tells us that the concept is "primitive." Presum- 
ably, this is a way of saying it is a priori and that it is not derivable 
from experience: we simply have the concept. On the other hand, he 
accepts the question about the origin of the concept of a person as 
a question to be answered. But he is uneasy about his attempts in 
this direction, saying of them that they "might count as beginnings 
or fragments of an answer"4 which do not "satisfy this demand at all 
fully."5 Because most of Strawson's efforts are devoted to dealing 
with the question of the applicability of the concept and because he 
is less uneasy about these efforts, it is sensible to return to this 
question. 
How does the concept of a person apply to a subject of experi- 
ences? To answer this question on the basis of the "Persons" chapter 
it is necessary to describe what a person is for Strawson. He pro- 
vides a useful summary of his views: 
... Among the things we ascribe to ourselves are things of a kind that we also 
ascribe to material bodies to which we should not dream of ascribing others of 
the things that we ascribe to ourselves. Now there seems nothing needing expla- 
nation in the fact that the particular height, colouring, physical position which 
we ascribe to ourselves should be ascribed to something or other; for that which 
one calls one's body is, at least, a body, a material thing. It can be picked out 
from others, identified by ordinary physical criteria and described in ordinary 
physical terms.... It can and must seem to need explanation that one's states 
of consciousness, one's thoughts and sensations, are ascribed to the very same 
thing to which these physical characteristics, this physical situation, is ascribed.6 
Several pages later he says: 
. . .We do . . . ascribe certain corporeal characteristics not simply to the body 
standing in this special relation ["possession"] to the thing to which we ascribe 
4 Op. cit., p. 111. Emphasis mine. 
5 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 
6 Ibid., p. 89. 
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those thoughts and feelings, &c., but to the thing itself to which we ascribe 
those thoughts and feelings.7 
These passages make two things clear. First, Strawson believes a 
person is not merely his body or his thoughts and feelings, etc., or 
even some combination of the two. A person is, at least in part, the 
"thing itself" which "possesses" both the body and the experiences.8 
That is, a whole person (so to speak) is something in addition to his 
body and his experiences, something to which his body and experi- 
ences belong. Second, he also believes that a person's body is a 
material thing which can be identified by "ordinary physical criteria." 
For him this means there are descriptions in terms of relational and 
nonrelational properties such that for each body there is at least one 
unique description;9 put more briefly, bodies are subject to individu- 
ating descriptions. 
We see, therefore, that in Strawson's view a person involves a 
body, a set of experiences and, in addition something which may be 
said to "possess" both. The subject of experiences is the same as that 
which "has" the relevant body.10 We saw earlier that Strawson denies 
that we can experience the subject of experiences. Consequently, we 
cannot experience the subject which possesses the body. With these 
essentials in mind, we may return to the question of how we apply 
the concept of a person to the subject of experiences. 
One could rephrase the question as follows: how can we tell 
when and where there are persons, i.e., the "things themselves" to 
which the concept applies and which exist over and above human 
bodies and human experiences? We have already seen the key to what 
I think must be Strawson's answer: bodies ". . . can be picked out 
from others, identified by ordinary physical criteria and described in 
ordinary physical terms."1 That is, bodies can be uniquely specified 
by means of unique descriptions. This may not look like an answer to 
our question because it tells us about bodies rather than subjects 
which have bodies and Strawson has distinguished the two. 
Because Strawson believes subjects are unobservable or in- 
7 Ibid., p. 93. 
8 The use of 'possesses,' with quotation marks, is Strawson's. 
9 This is one of the main points of the first chapter of Individuals. By means of 
such descriptions, Strawson believes, we are able to make "identifying references" to 
things. 
10 Usually, when I talk of persons, I have in mind Strawson's subjects. But when 
I speak less technically, as in the preceding sentence, I rely on the context to make my 
meaning clear. Numerous relevant distinctions not drawn by Strawson are drawn by 
Locke in his Essay in the chapter "Of Identity and Diversity." 
11 Op. cit., p. 111. 
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capable of being experienced and that for each (living, human) body 
there is a single subject, he apparently believes that one can apply 
the concept of a person "via" a person's body, as it were. That is, 
he seems to claim that we can know when and where persons are 
because we can locate one of their "possessions," their bodies, in 
space and time. To believe this is to believe that the occurrence of 
certain patterns of physical characteristics, viz., those constituting 
the body of a living human, entitles us to assert the existence of a 
person. More pointedly, it is to believe that there is a guide to things 
we do not experience among the things we do experience: certain 
kinds of patterns of physical characteristics entitle us to say there 
exists an unobserved kind of subject, viz., persons. 
Our main question has been: how does the concept of a person 
apply to the Strawsonian subject? If one allows that our knowledge 
that there are certain kinds of bodies licenses us to say there are 
persons, or, in other words, that one can apply the concept of a per- 
son "via" someone's body, then there is no problem in knowing the 
existence of such subjects. I believe that while Strawson does not 
assert this conditional and its antecedent, he is committed to it. 
Some more direct textual evidence of his commitment comes from 
his book on Kant, The Bounds of Sense."2 
In that book Strawson repeatedly emphasizes that the concept 
of a person must have empirical criteria for its applicability.3 Some- 
times he says that the concept of a person is empirical. Since he does 
not also say we experience subjects of experience,14 saying the con- 
cept is empirical is, presumably, a way of alluding to the empirical 
criteria, the locating of human bodies, which we employ in applying 
the concept. Thus this claim does not tell against the concept's being 
a priori in the sense I spelled out above-. the concept is not derived 
or obtained from an experience of a subject. Further, Strawson main- 
tains that the necessary, but not sufficient, criteria for identifying 
persons have to do with human bodies. He says that Kant 
. . .barely alludes to the fact that our ordinary concept of personal identity 
does carry with it empirically applicable criteria for the numerical identity 
12 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966). Here- 
after I shall refer to this as BOS. 
13 See, for example, BOS, p. 166. 
14 Strawson mentions this possibility several times. See, for example, BOS, pp. 105-6 
and p. 164. In the latter context, he comes close to saying subjects of experience are 
experienced. But since he does not distinguish between a person's body and "his" sub- 
ject of experiences, one may read him as saying that a person's body is what is 
experienced. 
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through time of a subject of experiences (a man or human being) and that these 
criteria, though not the same as those for bodily identity, involve an essential 
reference to the human body.15 
Later in the same context, he says: 
. . .We may talk, confidently, of an undeniably persistent object, a man, who 
perceptibly traces a physical, spatiotemporal route through the world and to 
whom a series of experiences may be ascribed with no fear that there is nothing 
persistent to which they are being ascribed.16 
The first passage suggests the insufficiency and at the same time 
the necessity of identifying a body for identifying a subject. The 
second passage emphasizes the perceivable, physical traces of a 
person. I have argued that Strawson distinguishes a person from his 
body (and his experiences) and claims that we identify a person 
"via" his body. These passages are compatible with, and the first 
passage encourages, this interpretation. Because one's body is not 
identical with the subject, bodily identity is not by itself sufficient 
for personal identity. Some additional principle, such as the suffi- 
ciency of one's knowing that there is a human body for saying there 
is a person, is needed. This principle, I submit, Strawson takes for 
granted in both Individuals and The Bounds of Sense. It is the third 
claim I wanted to attribute to Strawson. 
Thus far I have argued that Strawson's a priori concept of a 
person is applied to a subject which cannot be experienced "via" a 
certain (kind of) body. I think that there are serious difficulties 
with this position and some philosophically interesting reasons why 
Strawson does not recognize them. Both the difficulties and the 
reasons for failing to see them will be presented next. 
II 
There are two serious difficulties with the view expressed by the 
three claims attributed to Strawson. One is that there seems to be no 
direct empirical basis for the claim that there are Strawsonian per- 
sons. The other is that Strawson's arguments for the claim do not 
succeed. 
The lack of direct empirical basis, at least according to Strawson, 
is established by his denial that we experience subjects and the 
additional denial that such subjects are any series of bodily and/or 
mental states. According to these denials, we cannot experience sub- 
jects either (directly) in a single experience or (indirectly) in a series 
of experiences of the relevant states of a person. Indeed, as we saw 
above, our knowledge that there are persons is a matter of conclud- 
15 Ibid., p. 164. 
16 Ibid. 
How WELL CAN ONE GET TO KNOW A STRAWSONIAN PERSON? 521 
ing, by inference, that certain things (viz., subjects which "have" 
experiences and bodily characteristics) exist, on the basis of observ- 
ing the existence of the appropriate bodies and/or psychological 
states and the claim that where there is the appropriate body and/or 
psychological state, there is a subject. Thus there is no direct empir- 
ical basis for saying there are Strawsonian persons. 
That Strawson's arguments do not show there are such persons 
I shall argue here in a very limited way" by considering his answer 
to a central question: how do we know that there are Strawsonian 
persons at all? We now know the answer will not be: by appeal to 
experience alone. We are given a different sort of reply: 
... We do . . . ascribe certain corporeal characteristics not simply to the body 
standing in this special relation to the thing itself to which we ascribe those 
thoughts and feelings. For we say 'I am bald' as well as 'I am cold', 'I am 
lying on the hearthrug' as well as 'I see a spider on the ceiling'.18 
The answer is a linguistic one: because we use a single pronoun in 
ascribing both physical characteristics and experiences to ourselves, 
there is a'asingle Thing which has both. The argument is not very 
persuasive." It turns dn' 'assuming, among other things, that the 
pronoun is a designating term and't'hat 'it, designates a single thing. 
Not only does the so-called family resemblance argument show that 
the unqualified one word-one thing assumption is dubious, or', at 
least, requires justification, but in addition others such as Hume 
have suggested that such pronouns designate a whole set of things.20 
Strawson gives us no adequate reason for opting for his view of the 
referents of personal pronouns rather than the Humean kind of view 
that they refer to complicated series of items related in various ways. 
Because Strawson's argument is not very persuasive, and because 
direct experience of persons is unavailable, there is little reason 
provided to believe that there are persons in his sense, viz., unob- 
servable subjects.21 Thus there is to a certain extent good reason for 
17 For further support, see my "Strawson on Persons," The Modern Schoolman, 
Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (1971), pp. 237-262. I do not argue against so-called transcendental 
arguments as such; I argue against Strawson's specific arguments. 
18 Individuals, p. 93. 
19 Strawson has other arguments (see footnote 17). I cite this one because it is 
central. About the persuasiveness of this argument I shall say more later. 
20 I refer to the discussion of personal identity in Hume's Treatise of Human 
Nature. 
21 For a recent argument which aims at showing, in effect, that Strawsonian selves 
are observable, see R. Chisholm, "On the Observability of the Self," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (1969), pp. 7-21. Both it and a discussion 
of mine appear in Paul Kurtz, ed., Language and Human Nature (St. Louis: Warren H. 
Green, Inc., 1971). 
522 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
not accepting (though not necessarily for rejecting) the view that 
we (may) apply concepts of persons to subjects of experience "via" 
living human bodies. If this conclusion is justified, one wonders why 
Strawson does not see it. I shall suggest three reasons. The first is 
that although he confronts the issue of the lack of experiential con- 
firmation in The Bounds of Sense, he sees it as directed against a 
view different from his own. The second is that the nature of descrip- 
tive metaphysics as he sometimes describes it does not involve the 
kind of existential assertions he wants to make elsewhere. Finally, he 
sometimes approaches, but only approaches, saying that we have the 
concept of a person but that there is no object proper for it. I shall 
take these up in order. 
One of the implications of the first part of the paper is that 
Strawson has a variant of a substantialist view of selves: there is a 
single, enduring subject of experiences and bodily states. Another 
conclusion was that, on Strawson's own word, we do not experience 
such subjects. Therefore, one might say, as I just did, that there is no 
direct empirical confirmation of such a view. Strawson is well aware 
of this kind of criticism. Indeed, he says that Kant in his attack on a 
kindred view did not develop it sufficiently. Strawson approaches the 
alleged error in the following way: 
We have criteria of singularity and identity for subjects of experience (people, 
men). If we are to talk of individual souls or consciousnesses as well, we need 
criteria of singularity and identity for them. The only way to guarantee a conse- 
quence which must surely rate as an adequacy condition for an admissible con- 
cept of an individual soul or consciousness-viz. that a normal man, in the 
course of a normal life, has at any time just one soul or consciousness which 
lasts him throughout-is to allow that the notions of singularity and identity of 
souls or consciousnesses are conceptually dependent on, conceptually derive 
from, the notions of singularity and identity of men or people. The rule for de- 
riving the criteria we need from the criteria we have is very simple. It is: one 
person, one consciousness; same person, same consciousness. Acceptance of this 
rule of deriveration, however, is the suicide of rational psychology.22 
Why is it "suicide" to accept such a rule according to which one may 
say there is a single "soul" or "consciousness"? 
. . .We are tempted to think that we have knowledge of a continuing, identical 
subject, as such, knowledge which is independent of any empirical criteria of 
identity. We try, as it were, to abstract the force of "I" from the background 
of empirical criteria which give it its power of referring to a continuing subject 
and yet still view it as possessing that power. But if we do perform this abstrac- 
tion, there is nothing for the word to express except consciousness in general, 
or the general conditions of the possibility of experience. Thus we confound the 
unity of experience with the experience of unity; and thus there arises the 
illusion of knowledge of the soul as a persisting immaterial thing. But it is only 
22 BOS, pp. 168-9. 
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an illusion; and if we succumb to it, we are powerless to defend such a view 
of the soul against rival and less flattering theories, since no empirical means 
of decision between them is available.23 
The suicide of rational psychology occurs, then, when one uses a 
"rule" which permits one to say, on grounds not wholly empirical, 
that there are "souls" or "consciousnesses." Strawson misrepresents 
somewhat the view in question. The view is not that we have no 
empirical criteria for identifying a "soul," but rather that the criteria 
for identifying "souls" are only partially empirical. They are the 
criteria involved in identifying people or men. In addition to these 
criteria, a "rule" saying (roughly) that where there is a person, there 
is a "soul" is involved. He goes on to say that the view confounds the 
unity of experience with the experience of unity and intimates that 
we have only the unity of experience available. His saying this indi- 
cates once more both his concern with the issue of direct experience 
of persons and his apparent denial that we experience persons (in 
his more strict use of the word). What bothers him about the "rule" 
is that it licenses inferences about the existence of "items" or "things" 
which cannot be experienced. Thus these passages indicate how well 
aware Strawson is of the kind of critique I have made of his own 
view. One cannot help asking, therefore, why he fails to see its applic- 
ability to his proposal. 
A reason is not hard to find. Strawson sees, rightly, that such an 
attack was directed against a view different in certain respects from 
his own, a view involving "souls" or "thinking substances" which lack 
physical, and especially spatial, characteristics. 
The doctrine to be attacked is the doctrine that each of us, by the mere fact 
of conscious experience, knows that he exists as a Cartesian thinking substance, 
i.e. as an immaterial, persisting, non-composite, individual subject of thoughts 
and experiences, capable of existence in total independence of body or matter.24 
Strawson's view is: knowledge of bodies, not merely of conscious 
experience, is necessary to knowledge of a subject of experiences; 
such a subject is material in that it has physical characteristics 
(M-predicates are applicable to it); such a subject is not capable of 
existence apart from body or matter - as we have seen it is because 
Strawson assumes they are dependent upon one another that he can 
say human bodies enable us to know when and where there are 
subjects of experience. My suggestion is that because Strawson views 
the Kantian critique in the context of a view different from his own, 
he fails to question, and in turn recognize, its applicability to his own 
23 Ibid., p. 38. 
24 Ibid., p. 27. 
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view. That is, because the critique is against views involving "souls" 
rather than Strawsonian persons, he can sympathize with it without 
recognizing its implications. 
One could make the point somewhat differently. The "rule of 
derivation" which is the "suicide of rational psychology" is that 
where there is one person, one may claim there is one consciousness. 
Thus the "rule" involves persons and consciousnesses. (This alone 
shows that the view is different from that of Strawson.) One may 
take advantage of the formulation to state the "rule" Strawson 
accepts; one living human body, one person (subject) or, what comes 
to the same thing, same living, human body, same person. To be sure, 
the rules are different. So one might focus on the former rather than 
the latter; Strawson obviously does so. But because the criticism of 
the former is equally applicable to the latter, the difference makes 
no difference. 
Another reason why Strawson may not see the force of this line 
of criticism has to do with the nature of so-called descriptive meta- 
physics. Sometimes Strawson makes statements suggesting that he 
is not concerned so much with what "exists" as with "existent-talk" 
or "existent-thought." I am thinking of such statements as "descrip- 
tive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our 
thought about the world" and that "up to a point, the reliance upon 
a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed 
the only sure, way in philosophy."25 Suppose, for example, one viewed 
the question "What kinds of things exist?" as a question about what 
kinds of talk we engage in, what kinds of things we are willing to say 
exist in our ordinary discourse. If one did not incorporate into this 
question the issue of what and how what we observe justifies such 
ways of talking, it would follow that one could answer the question 
what exists by looking just at our uses of language. The question of 
whether there are, for example, subjects, becomes in this way of 
proceeding, the question of whether we talk as if there are subjects: 
whether we use personal pronouns, whether we talk of a person as 
25 Individuals, p. xiii. In the first chapter and elsewhere, Strawson talks about how 
we talk and think about the world. In addition, he considers how our talk and thought 
is related to various observable things and situations. For example, he says: "If, then, 
there are any basic particulars in the sense I have indicated, it seems that the sense in 
which they must be observable is not merely this: that it should be correct to speak 
of observing them. It seems likely, rather, that they must be public objects of percep- 
tion, particular objects of such kinds that different people can quite literally see or 
hear or feel by contact or taste or smell the same objects of these kinds." (Individuals, 
p. 45. Emphasis mine.) 
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something more than his various states, etc.26 Such an enterprise 
could presumably be called descriptive metaphysics: it involves both 
a kind of description and a kind of concern with existential questions. 
It is this enterprise which gives an argument considered earlier con- 
siderably more plausibility: 
... We do . . . ascribe certain corporeal characteristics not simply to the body 
standing in this special relation to the thing to which we ascribe thoughts and 
feelings, &c., but to the thing to which we ascribe those thoughts and feelings. 
For we say 'I am bald' as well as 'I am cold', 'I am lying on the hearthrug' as 
well as 'I see a spider on the ceiling'.27 
If what is being said here is that our way of talking suggests that we 
talk (and think) in terms of subjects and characteristics, that is one, 
perhaps true, claim. To conclude, as I think Strawson does, that sub- 
jects and (their) characteristics form different categories of existents 
is to make a very different and insufficiently warranted claim. It is 
to assume that ordinary language embodies the kind of "picture of 
reality" usually associated with so-called ideal languages. It is, as 
Austin puts it, "to fall once again into the error of reading back into 
the world the features of language."28 I submit that Strawson does 
not distinguish carefully and consistently enough between talk about 
talk of what exists and talk about what exists. Hence if he thinks 
primarily in terms of our "linguistic commitment" to subjects, he 
26 That Strawson may be sensitive to this way of proceeding is suggested by his 
comment that ". . . we may still want to ask what it is in the natural facts that makes 
it intelligible that we should have this concept, and to ask this in the hope of a non- 
trivial answer, i.e., in the hope of an answer which does not merely say: 'Well, there 
are people in the world'." Individuals, p. 111. 
S. Shoemaker, in Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1963) also illustrates what I have in mind. On pp. 43-44 he says: "If one says that 
a person is essentially something that thinks, experiences, and so on, or that a person 
is something that thinks, experiences, and so on . . . it would seem that at least part 
of what one is saying is an obvious truism, namely that a person is at least something 
that thinks and experiences, something that has 'psychological features.' For what is 
this but to say that persons think, have pains, desire things, and so forth? . . . The 
claim that a person is a substance is sometimes expressed by saying that a person is a 
subject of thought and experience. It is difficult to see what can be meant by the ex- 
pression 'subject of thought and experience' if it does not mean 'something that thinks 
and experiences (has experiences).' But if it means this, and if persons think and have 
experiences, it follows that a person is a subject of thought and experience, and there- 
fore a substance. To say that a person is a substance in this sense is but another way 
of expressing the truism mentioned above." 
27 Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
28 J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), Second 
Edition, p. 125. 
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may not see clearly the force of objections to the view that persons 
are genuine "things" or "items" (to use his words once again).29 
Finally, Strawson approaches asserting but does not seem fully 
willing to assert that we have the concept of persons but that there 
are no persons (viewed as "things"). In other words, he does not 
seem willing to assert that we have a concept but that there is no 
object proper for it. We saw at the outset of Part I that an empiri- 
cistic demand regarding the origin of concepts is mentioned as well 
as accepted and that this demand gives rise to a paradox. The para- 
dox arose because he accepts three claims: we have the concept of 
persons, we do not experience persons, and concepts are "derived 
from" the appropriate objects. Kant once posed a very pertinent 
question, viz., how do concepts which we have but which do not 
derive or arise from what we experience apply to what we experience: 
But pure concepts of understanding being quite heterogeneous from empiri- 
cal intuitions, and indeed from all sensible intuitions, can never be met within 
any intuition. For no one will say that a category, such as that of causality, can 
be intuited through sense and is itself contained in appearance. How, then, is 
the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category 
to appearances, possible?30 
Kant's answer to this kind of question is difficult. Fortunately, 
for present purposes we need not consider it. But it deserves mention 
that part of his answer involved giving up the claim that there is an 
object for every concept that we have. Equally important was the 
twist Kant gave to empiricism. He emphasized that while concepts 
we have and employ need not "come from" experience, they must, if 
they are to be other than "empty," be applicable to experience. 
Strawson approaches, without accepting, this position by emphasizing 
the "empirical criteria" needed to apply our concept of a person. To 
call attention to these criteria is to call attention to what we can and 
do "directly" experience and, at the same time, to direct attention 
away from that all-important (to Strawson) component of human 
beings, the subject of experiences and bodily characteristics. This 
emphasis on the observable rather than the unobservable aspects 
of humans may be another reason why the objections I have raised 
do not seem forceful to him; indeed, they do not occur to him. 
Were Strawson willing to say in a Kantian vein that persons need 
not exist as "items" or "things" in order for us to talk in an empiri- 
29 E. B. Allaire, in "Bergmann's Ontologies" in The Ontological Turn (eds. M. S. 
Gram and E. D. Klemke), The University of Iowa Press, 1974, develops this notion of 
what I call "linguistic commitment." 
30 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), translated 
by N. Kemp Smith, B 177, A 138. 
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cally significant way about them, my objections would not be appli- 
cable. But Strawson's saying that would entail, if my earlier argu- 
ments are sound, a major revision of his view. It would entail saying 
that although we talk as if there are existing persons or subjects in 
addition to human bodies and experience, there are no such subjects. 
Or, at least, there need not be such subjects. 
I shall conclude by rehearsing some of the central points. Straw- 
son's attachment to empiricism is such that he does not want to 
admit the existence of objects we cannot experience directly.' Sub- 
jects of experience and bodily characteristics, or, in other words, 
persons in his strict sense of the word, are such objects. The intellec- 
tual tension which these conflicting tendencies cause is in part 
relieved by Strawson's ability to distinguish his view from others. 
No less important is his ability to specify, in effect, a "rule" by which 
we may locate persons or say where they are. This "rule" is never put 
to the kind of empirical test he urges; if it were, he (if consistent) 
would have to revert to the paradoxical position of demanding direct 
experience of persons and denying that there is such experience. By 
directing our attention to linguistic evidence which shows, from one 
perspective, that we speak and think as if there are persons, and by 
emphasizing that part of the answer to the question of where persons 
are which does involve empirical criteria, namely the location of 
human bodies, Strawson avoids confronting the lingering paradox." 
DONALD SIEVERT. 
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, COLUMBIA. 
31 Fred Korn, in conversation, suggested that one think of Strawson as a "reluctant 
phenomenalist." On the one hand, Strawson is interested in attempts to describe ob- 
jects, including persons, in terms of their (in principle) observable characteristics or 
qualities; on the other hand, he is inclined toward insisting that things and persons 
consist of an additional element not "caught" by such descriptions, however, complex 
and complete. Both tendencies are clearly present in the first chapter of Individuals; 
also, see footnote 25. 
